Stipulative Agency by Lam, Derek
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility vol. 7 
 1 of 34 
Stipulative Agency 
Derek Lam 
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater 
Abstract. 
An agent’s knowledge of her own intentional actions (agential knowledge) is non-
observational. Yet, intentional actions typically consist of happenings external to the 
agents. A theory is needed to explain how agents are warranted to form such beliefs 
independent of observation. This paper first argues for three desirable features of an 
ideal theory about agential knowledge. After showing that no existing theories possess 
all three, a novel theory that does is presented. According to this theory, agential 
knowledge is the same kind of knowledge as the Kripkean contingent a priori: they are 
knowledge justified a priori by stipulation. 
 
Keywords: Anscombe, Contingent A Priori, First-Person Knowledge, Intentional 
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1 Agential Knowledge and Non-Observational Warrant 
When someone acts intentionally, she knows what she’s doing. Call someone’s knowledge of her 
own intentional action agential knowledge.1 Agential knowledge is constitutive of the intentional 
action she performs. 
 
1 Philosophers sometimes call this ‘practical knowledge’. However, the term ‘practical knowledge’ is 
frequently used to refer to the knowledge of how to do things. I choose the term ‘agential knowledge’ to 
avoid confusion. 
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 Agential knowledge is peculiar. Ellie is climbing a tree to save a cat. Joel is at the scene. He 
knows that Ellie is saving the cat. Of course, Ellie herself knows that she is saving the cat. But, 
intuitively, Ellie’s first-person knowledge about her action and the Joel’s third-person knowledge 
about Ellie’s action are different in kind. 
 This category difference manifests itself in multiple ways (see O’Brien 2003: 360-366); I 
won’t be able to address them all. This essay focuses on the apparently non-observational 
character of agential knowledge Anscombe (2000/1957) famously noticed. Whereas both Joel 
and Ellie are warranted in believing that the latter is saving the cat, their warrants are different in 
kind such that Ellie’s warrant is, in a unique way, not based on observation. She doesn’t learn 
that she’s saving a cat because she observes anything. Let’s call this claim about the non-
observational warrant of agential knowledge the Non-Observational Thesis (NOT). 
 As Anscombe noted, whereas observation surely plays a role when we perform intentional 
actions, it plays the role of helping us execute those actions. For example, when I write my name 
on the whiteboard, I observe, among other things, what’s going on on the board. But observation 
is only used to guide my action so that I can write my name properly. I don’t typically come to 
know that I’m writing my name via observation. The observation typically plays a practical role 
instead of an epistemic role for the agent (see Falvey 2000: 32).2 
 
2 The word ‘typically’ is important. NOT itself doesn’t deny that agents also have observational evidence 
at their disposal that could justify their beliefs about what they are doing intentionally. What NOT says is 
that this isn’t typically the actual epistemic basis of our first-person agential knowledge. That being said, 
some action theorists go further. For example, Moran would say that we just don’t have observational 
resources to justify our agential knowledge. See section 5.3. 
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 Now it isn’t uncommon for people to use the word ‘observation’ only for the outer senses, 
thereby excluding other forms of sensory access like proprioception and kinesthesis. But the 
intuition underlying NOT runs deeper. It also challenges attempts to base agential knowledge on 
these other forms of senses. Here’s how Schwenkler puts it: 
 
Well, what exactly do we mean in this context when we speak of an observer, and of 
knowledge had by observation? Surely, the implication of a reliance on sense perception 
is important here, but the notion of observation connotes more than this: observation 
involves not just perceiving something, but doing so somehow passively; to observe 
something is to sit back, as it were, and simply take it in for whatever it happens to be. 
(2011: 146) 
 
A big part of the intuitive appeal of NOT is that, when we’re aware of our intentional action, 
such awareness typically isn’t acquired as information given to us. Agential knowledge isn’t 
passive like observational knowledge. 
 One way to bring this intuition to a sharper focus is to consider how the word ‘notice’ is 
used. When you see a pen on the desk, it’s appropriate to say that you notice a pen on the desk. 
When I hear piano music, it’s appropriate to say that I notice someone playing the piano. For any 
knowledge obtained via the outer senses, we can describe that as our noticing something. 
 But ‘notice’ covers more than just the outer senses. It’s also sensible to say I notice the 
following things: (i) that I’m tapping my foot to the beat, (ii) that I’m crossing my legs, (iii) that 
I’m grumpy, etc. So, it’s sensible to speak of (i) kinesthesis, (ii) proprioception, and (iii) 
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introspection as us noticing something. By contrast, we don’t say that we notice what we do if 
the action is intentional. 
 My contention is that our linguistic intuition about how to use the word ‘notice’ echoes our 
intuition about a passive form of knowing. And intuitively, for reasons yet to be uncovered, our 
agential knowledge doesn’t belong to this category. Hereafter, I’ll use the word ‘observation’ to 
cover all forms of noticing: outer senses, kinesthesis, proprioception, introspection, etc. 
 None of this is meant to be conclusive evidence for NOT. What I hope to have shown, 
however, is that NOT is a plausible starting point for our inquiry. 
 
2. Three Desirable Features 
As Anscombe pointed out, an intentional action has to be intentional under a proper description, 
and the agent’s agential knowledge about his own action must be under that description. She 
argued: ‘The only description that I clearly know of what I am doing may be of something that is 
at a distance from me.’ (2000/1957: 53) We know what we do as writing on the board, baking 
bread, walking one’s dog, etc., not just some internal flickers of the will. Intentional actions often 
consist of happenings beyond our skin. 
 This makes the idea of non-observational agential knowledge puzzling: if our intentional 
actions can consist of happenings beyond our skin, knowledge about our intentional actions may 
consist of knowledge about external happenings. Knowledge is at least warranted beliefs. How 
can our beliefs about external happenings be warranted non-observationally? Schwenkler calls 
this the Self-Knowledge Problem (2011: 139). 
 So, we need a theory of agential knowledge that can tell us what exactly is the source of our 
non-observational, epistemic warrant to form beliefs about our own intentional actions which 
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typically contain external happenings.3 But before we plunge ourselves into theory crafting, it’s 
helpful to take a step back and ask: what do we want our theory to look like? I’ll present three 
features that we have reason to desire in our theory. 
 
2.1 Warrant in Virtue of Action 
I briefly discussed that our agential knowledge isn’t a form of noticing (i.e., a passive form of 
knowing) but observation is. I relied on there being a shared intuition. But there are considerable 
amount of confusion pertaining to this intuition. More can be said to clarify it. Doing so can help 
us get a better sense of what we want our theory of non-passive and non-observational agential 
knowledge to look like. 
 What exactly it is that appears intuitive to us when it rings true to say that agential 
knowledge isn’t a passive form of knowing? Some philosophers unpack this intuition in terms of 
the productivity of agential knowledge. According to them, it’s part of the essence of agential 
 
3 By framing the problem in terms of warrant for beliefs, I set aside Campbell’s (2018) theory about 
agential knowledge. She thinks that there are two kinds of knowledge. Whereas standardly knowledge is 
considered beliefs (with extra qualifications), Campbell argues that intentions can sometimes play the 
knowledge-role that beliefs play and, therefore, there is another kind of knowledge that aren’t beliefs but 
intentions. Since intentions aren’t warranted by observation, this kind of knowledge is non-observational. 
Our agential knowledge happens to be an instance of that. My concern is that, even if I grant everything 
Campell says, agents do have beliefs about their intentional actions and those beliefs do appears to be 
warranted independent of observation. Unless Campbell wants to deny that agents have belief-based 
agential knowledge, adding an extra kind of knowledge doesn’t seem relevant to shedding light on the 
nature of the belief-based one. 
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knowledge that it guides the action itself. My belief, which is my agential knowledge, that I’m 
peeling an orange serves as a focal point that guides the proper unfolding of the orange peeling. 
Moran (2001) argues that information obtained via observation only tells us what happens and 
doesn’t tell us what should or shouldn’t happen.4 Hence, knowing something via observation 
doesn’t have the productive feature of our agential knowledge. Here are at least two reasons for 
suspecting that this isn’t what the intuitive activeness of agential knowledge is about primarily. 
 First of all, our intentional actions aren’t something that we notice regardless of whether 
those actions are basic. Basic actions are actions that we don’t perform by performing other 
actions as intermediate steps.5 For example, when one winks at people, the action is intentional 
and is typically performed as one simple act without intermediate steps. If our agential 
knowledge is active in the sense that it informs us how we should act to perform that action, that 
action must be non-basic. But we have non-observational agential knowledge of basic actions 
too. 
 Second, I stated that the word ‘notice’ expresses a kind of passive knowing that our agential 
knowledge intuitively isn’t. It’s telling that the idea of a passive form of knowing finds its 
natural expression in our choice of the verb in a knowledge claim. This indicates prima facie that 
the relevant intuition is primarily about the passiveness of how we come to have such knowledge 
 
4 He says: ‘[T]he person’s consciousness of his activity is not something that stands outside it observing 
but infuses and informs it, making a describable difference in the kind of activity it is.’ (2001: 31; my 
emphasis) See also Paul (2012: 330). 
5 See Danto 1963; 1965. Lavin (2013) and Thompson (2008) both challenge the idea of basic actions. For 
a response, see Amaya’s (2017). 
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instead of about how the knowledge is put into use. The kind of activeness Moran et al. focuses 
on is about how a piece of knowledge is used. 
 What then would it take for a form of knowing to be active in the way our agential 
knowledge intuitively is? One way to answer this question is to consult our linguistic intuition 
again. Imagine that you’re at a restaurant. You decide to savor your soup slowly. The dutiful 
server thought that you were done with the soup. He walks over and try to take it out of your 
way: 
 
‘I’m still working on this.’ You said. 
As he walked away, your friend said, ‘I’m glad you noticed that. I’ve had to starve 
because someone took away my half-finished meal once.’ 
‘To be fair, he made sure I saw him doing that.’ 
‘Oh, I meant I was glad you noticed that you were still working on the soup.’ 
‘…Huh? What do you mean by my noticing that?’ 
‘I thought you knew that you were still working on the soup?’ 
 
In this bizarre scenario, you and your friend agreed that you knew that you were working on the 
soup. What confused you was your friend’s description of the way you acquired that knowledge. 
Your friend described it as you noticing something. Thus, an intuitive response in this scenario 
shouldn’t just show that you know (which is a common ground of the conversation) but should 
be understood as an attempt to shed light on how you knew that’s what you were doing. 
 What response would be pre-theoretically natural? I reckon it would be some variations of 
this: 
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‘I’m confused. Of course I knew. I meant to finish the soup!’ 
 
By saying ‘I meant to finish the soup’, I’m not simply saying that I’ve the intention to work on 
the soup — we have many inefficacious intentions after all. Instead, I’m saying that working on 
the soup is an action I’m performing intentionally. This shows, when one is in a position where 
one must explain how one obtains knowledge about one’s intentional action instead of noticing 
it, it’s natural to cite the intentional action itself as explanation. 
 The question about how one comes to have a piece of knowledge is a question about one’s 
warrant for the relevant belief. So, preferably, our account of agential knowledge can somehow 
explain our agential knowledge’s non-observational epistemic warrant — not just its truth — by 
the intentional actions themselves. For example, I’ve the agential knowledge that I’m peeling an 
orange. The fact that I’m peeling an orange isn’t only why my belief that I’m peeling an orange 
is true. Preferably, it’s also somehow a part of what gives my belief epistemic warrant. This is the 
first desirable feature. As far as I know, only Haddock (2011) has explicitly acknowledged this 
feature of agential knowledge. 
 
2.2 Unified Maker’s Knowledge 
Consider the following two cases Anscombe uses to examine the nature of agential knowledge: 
 
Say I go over to the window and open it. Someone who hears me moving calls out: What 
are you doing making that noise? I reply “Opening the window”. I have called such a 
statement knowledge all along. (2000/1957: 51) 
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We can now consider “practical knowledge” [i.e. agential knowledge]. Imagine someone 
directing a project, like the erection of a building which he cannot see and does not get 
reports on, purely by giving orders. […] His knowledge of what is done is practical 
knowledge. But what is this “knowledge of what is done”? First and foremost, he can 
say what the house is like. (ibid: 82) 
 
The cases are remarkably different. In the window-case, what is being known is an action. In the 
builder-case, what’s being known are facts about the product of an action. 
 Despite the difference, it’s not unnatural to group them together. Knowledge of one’s 
intentional action has a natural affinity to knowledge of the product of one’s action (traditionally 
known as maker’s knowledge), an affinity that goes beyond the simple fact that there is a causal 
connection between one’s action and the products of one’s action. There is an intuitive — albeit 
slightly paradoxical — sense in which our intentional actions themselves are products of what 
we do. If so, agential knowledge is a form of maker’s knowledge.6 Ideally, we want a theory that 
unifies agential knowledge and maker’s knowledge. 
 There is a long history of interest in maker’s knowledge. Hobbes (1845/1656: 183-184) 
conceived of our geometrical knowledge as a form of maker’s knowledge in the hope of making 
sense of geometry’s certainty. Contrary to the rationalists’ obsession with the natural sciences, 
Locke (1979/1600: 2.31) was also interested in the epistemic status of humanities as a form of 
maker’s knowledge about the social-cultural world we create. Vico argued that the natural 
 
6 Anscombe used the term ‘practical knowledge’ for all sorts of maker’s knowledge. I reserve the term 
‘agential knowledge’ to our knowledge of our intentional actions. 
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sciences can achieve the status of knowledge to a certain extent only because their experimental 
procedure is a creation process, producing a form of maker’s knowledge (1988: 52; see also 
Gaukroger 1986: 33). Finally, Kripke (1980) is interested in our knowledge that the standard 
meter is one meter as maker’s knowledge of a measurement unit. 
 Developing an account of maker’s knowledge to bring all these forms of maker’s knowledge 
together is already a daunting task. It’s unrealistic to expect that we can, in this essay, develop a 
view of agential knowledge that delivers a grand unification of maker’s knowledge as such and 
agential knowledge. We may, however, realistically aim for something more modest. An account 
has no hope in eventually delivering said grand unification if it cannot unify agential knowledge 
and one kind of maker’s knowledge: Kripkean contingent a priori. Preferably, our account can 
offer us a framework that explicitly assimilates (i) our non-observationally warranted agential 
knowledge and (ii) the Kripkean contingent a priori as the same kind of knowledge. This is the 
second desirable feature.7 
 
2.3 Independent of Knowledge of Intention 
Our self-knowledge about beliefs is transparent: 
 
7 Is it arbitrary that I choose Kripkean contingent a priori over other forms of maker’s knowledge in my 
second desirable feature? Not in an objectionable way. Notice that I’m not neglecting other forms of 
maker’s knowledge. Ultimately, we should aspire to unify our agential knowledge and all forms of 
maker’s knowledge. We pick one out only to start somewhere. All endeavors begin with baby steps and 
we should pick our baby steps wisely. Choosing contingent a priori as our target for unification has its 
strategic value. But as long as all other forms of maker’s knowledge are still to be handled, this pragmatic 
arbitrariness isn’t objectionable. 
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 [I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally 
literally, directed outward — upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you think there is 
going to be a third world war?,” I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same 
outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be 
a third world war?” (Evans 1982: 225) 
 
The question about one’s belief is said to be transparent to the question about the things believed 
in the sense that ‘a first-person present-tense question about one’s belief is answered by 
reference to (or consideration of) the same reasons that would justify an answer to the 
corresponding question about the world.’ (Moran 2001: 62; see also Valaris 2014) 
 Some (e.g. Boyle 2004) appear to think that transparency is unique to self-knowledge about 
mental states under rational control (e.g. judgment). But self-knowledge about consciousness 
arguably also has this feature: 
 
[…] the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, 
distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. 
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other 
element is as if it were diaphanous. […] [T]hat which makes the sensation of blue a 
mental fact seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent — 
we look through it and see nothing but the blue […]. (Moore 1903: 446; also Harman 
1990: 667) 
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The transparency of conscious experiences is often described as the impossibility of attending to 
what it’s like to experience x without simply attending to x itself. The same is often said about 
the transparency of beliefs. In the quote from Evans, he said that to answer questions about what 
I believe, I must attend outwards. These are overstatements. 
 There are situations where it first occurs to us that we have certain beliefs and only then do 
we turn to the world to see whether it matches our beliefs. So, we can attend to our beliefs 
directly. The same is true for consciousness. By conceiving of my conscious experience of 
redness as being qualitatively the same as your conscious experience of greenness, we can bring 
our attention to our conscious experiences themselves and not the features experienced (Block 
1996: 27-28). As Kind (2003) argued, interpreted charitably, even Moore only seems to think 
that attending to our consciousness itself without simply attending to what we are conscious of is 
difficult or atypical, not impossible. The transparency of our beliefs and our consciousness 
should be understood as a weaker claim about our typical access to our beliefs and our 
consciousness. 
 Intentions are transparent too. Intentions are about actions. Typically, to figure out what to 
intend, we figure out what to do. As Shah (2008) notes ‘[a]iming to arrive at an intention with 
respect to A-ing via deliberation thus requires that you determine whether to A.’ (2)  
 Admittedly, the primary concern of Shah’s claim is deliberation as the practical process of 
making up our mind that produces intentions and actions, not the epistemic process of learning 
about our intentions and actions. One might then argue that the intuitiveness of Shah’s claim 
doesn’t support the transparency of intention as an epistemological feature of intention. 
 Yet, our agential knowledge is a form of maker’s knowledge (section 2.2), where we know 
about something by producing it. If we typically form our intentions by engaging in the 
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deliberative process of producing intentional actions as Shah says, what intentions we form 
depends on the process that produces intentional actions and thereby agential knowledge. We 
then have strong reason to agree with Setiya: ‘Our capacity for self-knowledge of belief exploits 
a prior capacity to know the world by forming beliefs about it. Like-wise, our capacity to know 
what we intend exploits a prior capacity to know what we are doing by forming intentions.’ 
(2011: 177) Analogy: since the kind of food poisoning one gets depends on one’s process of 
choosing what to eat, it’s implausible that the food one chooses depends on one’s knowledge 
about one’s food poisoning. Preferably, our theory doesn’t make our agential knowledge depend 
on our knowledge about our intentions. This is the third desirable feature. 
 
3 Something’s Missing 
There are plenty of theories about the non-observational character of agential knowledge. None 
of the major views have all the three desirable features we discussed in section 2: 
 
[1] warrant in virtue of the action itself; 
[2] unification with some form of maker’s knowledge (other than agential knowledge); 
[3] agential knowledge independent of self-knowledge about intention 
 
 According to Paul’s view (2009; 2012; 2015), our agential knowledge consists of three 
steps. First, we’ve maker’s knowledge about our conscious decisions simply by making those 
decisions. Second, our conscious decisions typically lead to the formation of intentions to do 
what we decide upon. This allows us to form inferentially justified beliefs about our intentions 
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based on the decisions we’ve made. Finally, since we’re disposed to do what we intend to do, 
we’re allowed to form inferentially justified beliefs about our actions based on our intentions.  
 This account doesn’t have [1] and [3]. Whereas this account says our self-knowledge about 
our decisions is based on our mental acts of making those decisions, it can’t say the same about 
all other intentional actions. Furthermore, by the light of Paul’s view, agential knowledge 
depends on knowledge about intention. 
 Extending Burge’s (1996) theory about our entitlement to hold beliefs about our mental 
states, O’Brien (2003; 2005; 2007) and Luthra (2017) explain the non-observational character of 
agential knowledge with the idea that we are, without the need for observation, epistemically 
entitled to hold warranted beliefs about our intentional actions. How so? Our intentional actions 
are products of rational deliberation. We cannot shape what we do rationally if we have no 
access to our intentional actions. Hence, the fact that we perform intentional actions via rational 
deliberation alone entails that we have warrant for holding beliefs about our intentional actions. 
 This account has [3]. Nothing in the aforementioned reasoning refers to knowledge of 
intentions. But it doesn’t have [1]. The non-observational warrant of our agential knowledge 
doesn’t stem from our performing those actions. All this approach says is that we couldn’t have 
performed rationally guided intentional actions if we hadn’t had access to our own actions. 
Given this assumption, that we perform intentional actions indeed entails that we’re warranted to 
form beliefs about our own actions. Yet, this is merely a fact entailing its own precondition. X’s 
precondition is entailed by but doesn’t stem from X.8 
 The Burge-inspired approach isn’t the only way to explain agential knowledge as some form 
of epistemic entitlement. Velleman (1989) and Setiya (2008, 2009, 2012) both think that we have 
 
8 See Gertler (2018) for further discussion. 
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non-observational warrant to hold beliefs about our intentional actions because we have non-
observational warrant to expect what we’ll do. On the one hand, Velleman thinks that we have 
warrant to do so because expectations about one’s own actions are self-fulfilling. Self-fulfilling 
expectations are automatically warranted. No prior evidence is required. On the other hand, 
Setiya thinks that these expectations are warranted because we have the non-propositional know-
how either for the expected actions themselves or for the actions we may perform in order to 
perform the expected actions. For Setiya, the non-propositional know-how for an action just is 
the disposition to perform that action if one intends to do so. No observation is required. 
 Velleman’s and Setiya’s views have [3]. But they don’t have [1]. Accounts that appeal to 
warrant for expectations before our actions clearly can’t ground the warrant for our agential 
knowledge on our performing those actions. When someone asks, ‘How do you know that you 
are working on your soup?’ These responses aren’t sensible: ‘Because I knew I was about to do 
so’, ‘Because I had the know-how’. Neither account captures the intuitive sense in which our 
agential knowledge is an active form of knowing, i.e., consists of epistemic warrant that stems 
from the intentional actions themselves. 
 Finally, there are views that explain NOT by extending the ‘reach’ of our introspection. This 
is done either (i) by working on the metaphysics of the things that are typically considered 
objects of introspection or (ii) by adopting a more liberal view of what can be represented by our 
introspective states. For example, Falvey (2000) rejects a sharp metaphysical distinction between 
intention and intentional action. By doing so, there is a sense in which introspective access to our 
intentions just is access to our intentional actions themselves. O’Shaughnessy (1980) does 
something similar by extending the state of willing beyond our skulls. On the contrary, in 
Peacocke’s (2009) discussion about mental actions, he argues that we have direct conscious 
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awareness of our mental actions.9 And it’s part of the possession conditions for concepts of 
mental actions (e.g. the concept ‘judging’) that someone who possesses those concepts takes her 
awareness of her own mental actions at face value. So, simply by possessing concepts for mental 
actions, a person is entitled to hold beliefs about the mental actions she’s performing. We can 
imagine extending this view to all intentional actions. 
 Since these views still rely on a passive form of knowing that can be described as we 
noticing something — whether it’s introspection or conscious awareness, they fall short of 
actually offering an account for the non-observational character of agential knowledge. These 
views don’t have [1]. And, quite clearly, they don’t have [3]. 
 I’ve been focusing on [1] and [3] and said nothing about [2]. Philosophers who develop 
views about agential knowledge don’t explicitly address the Kripkean contingent a priori. So, 
strictly speaking, none of these views, in their current forms, has [2]. That said, nothing prevents 
us from developing these views to cover other forms of maker’s knowledge. How optimistic we 
can be depends on the specific view. And we should be cautious that, whereas some views may 
allow us to explain how a person’s contingent a priori knowledge depends on her agential 
knowledge about what she does intentionally, that isn’t the same as explaining contingent a 
priori and agential knowledge as the same kind of knowledge with the same kind of epistemic 
warrant. (I’ll say more about this in section 5.) As it stands, it remains at least uncertain whether 
any of the theories currently available has [2]. 
 This essay focuses on the positive task. Although I state that none of the major theories have 
all [1] - [3], I don’t intend to argue that any of these theories should be abandoned simply for this 
reason. Perhaps they have other good features that overweigh the cost. Nonetheless, it’s 
 
9 Pickard (2004) holds a similar view, arguing that we can perceive our intentional actions from within. 
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dialectically valuable to have an account that clearly has all three features to serve as a reference 
point. My goal is to develop such an account. 
 
4 The Stipulative Account 
The Self-Knowledge Problem highlights the puzzling fact that agential knowledge is both 
warranted without observation and about external happenings. As puzzling as it may be, agential 
knowledge isn’t unique in this respect. Even if we set knowledge about abstract objects aside, the 
idea of non-observational knowledge about the external world isn’t unprecedented. Kripke 
(1980) argues that there are contingent facts about the world that one can know a priori: ‘A man 
might know [some of Aristotle’s achievements] a priori in some sense, if he in fact fixes the 
reference of “Aristotle” as the man who did one of [his famous achievements]. Still it won’t be a 
necessary truth for him.’ (62-63) Perhaps more famously, he states that a person who stipulates a 
stick’s length as the standard meter thereby knows a priori that the stick is one meter. In these 
cases, a person knows contingent facts a priori by going through certain procedures to create 
semantic facts about the reference/extension of notions like ‘meter’ and ‘Aristotle’. 
 Let’s focus on the case where a person picks a stick s as the standard meter. Her belief that s 
is one meter is justified solely on the basis of the meaning of ‘meter’ that she establishes by 
stipulation. This is a case of analytic justification in the sense that her belief is justified because 
it’s true in virtue of the proper semantic understanding of her concepts alone.10 My view is that 
 
10 Kripke hesitates to use the label ‘analytic’ for contingent a priori claims because he wants to emphasize 
that using a stick as the standard meter only fixes the reference of ‘meter’, not giving the notion any 
descriptive meaning (1980: 122). This is meant to be in contrast with the typical examples for analytic 
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agential knowledge is warranted in the same way. Agential knowledge is a form of knowledge 
by semantic stipulation. As analytically justified beliefs, they are warranted non-observationally. 
Call this the stipulative account of agential knowledge. To flesh out how the stipulative account 
works, we need two further ideas: physical stipulation and self-stipulation. 
 When we think about the standard cases of Kripkean contingent a priori, we typically think 
of stipulation as a mental act. It’s a mental act of deciding to pick this instead of that stick to be 
the standard meter. But stipulations don’t have to be mental acts.11 Suppose I’m a prison guard 
responsible for handing out numbered uniforms to new prisoners. Whatever number is on the 
 
truths like ‘bachelors are unmarried’, which are true in virtue of the descriptive meaning of the notions 
involved; in these cases, the a priori truths are also necessary. It’s harmless that Kripke, for his purpose, 
restricts the use of the term ‘analytic’. But here’s why I resist overcategorization. What Kripke says about 
the reference fixing of ‘meter’ applies to the first-person pronoun ‘I’ too. The act of uttering ‘I’m here 
now’ makes itself true. It’s a principle essentially associated with ‘I’ that ‘I’ refers to whoever is uttering 
it now. There are well-known reasons for thinking that this reference-fixing principle isn’t the descriptive 
meaning ‘I’ expresses. Yet, I reckon we can agree that, even if this isn’t what ‘I’ expresses, knowing that 
the reference of ‘I’ is fixed in this way is a crucial component of our understanding of the notion. That’s 
why it’s appropriate to say ‘I’m here now’ is true on the basis of the proper semantic understanding of 
the notions involved even if what’s understood aren’t the descriptive meanings of those notions. The same 
is applicable to the stipulator’s belief that s is one meter; it’s justified because it’s true in virtue of her 
semantic understanding of the notions involved alone. Since the interest in analytic truths as an 
epistemological category consists in the fact that we’re justified to believe in them because they are true 
solely in virtue of the proper semantic understanding of the notions involved, it’s epistemologically well-
principled to use ‘analytic’ in an inclusive way. 
11 This isn’t even how measurement are standardized, see Tal 2016, 2011. 
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uniform a prisoner receives, that is his/her prisoner number. I may not care enough to look at the 
numbers when I hand them out; nonetheless, by handing out a uniform with the number 24601 to 
a prisoner, I perform a physical act which itself stipulates the prisoner’s number to be 24601. 
That can be so even if, since I don’t care to look, I don’t have the belief that the prisoner is 
represented by the number 24601. This is a case of physical stipulation where the reference of a 
representation is fixed by a physical act. 
 Next, we sometimes do things with words. When I say ‘I apologize for the interruption’, this 
utterance doesn’t merely state the fact that I apologize. This utterance is itself the act of apology. 
Why is this utterance an act of apology? Partly because it says so. The same applies to utterances 
like ‘I promise…’ and ‘I consent…’. These speech acts do what they do partly because they say 
so.12 These are examples of a special form of physical stipulation — self-stipulation: they 
stipulate themselves to be the kind of action they are. Notice that stipulation itself can be an 
instance of self-stipulation: uttering ‘I hereby stipulate…’ is a speech act of stipulation that both 
stipulates whatever ‘…’ is and stipulates itself to be an act of stipulation. 
 Stipulation creates semantic facts. That’s what stipulations are. The act of handing out 
prisoner’s uniform creates the semantic fact that the number 24601 refers to a prisoner. By 
stipulating the utterance ‘I promise…’ to be an act of promise, I create the semantic fact that the 
utterance counts as part of the reference/extension of the notion ‘promise’. Having uttered ‘I 
 
12 I emphasize ‘partly’ because, surely, there are other factors. For example, to perform a speech act of 
promise, it isn’t sufficient that the agent says so. The interlocutor’s reception of the speech-act as a 
promise is arguably also required. I say more about such additional requirements for stipulations (and for 
intentional actions in general) in section 5.1. The detail doesn’t matter for our current purpose. 
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility vol. 7 
 20 of 34 
promise…’, my belief that I’m making a promise is justified because it’s true in virtue of the 
meaning of the notion ‘promise’. 
 The agential knowledge of self-stipulating speech acts (e.g., my knowledge that I’m making 
a promise while uttering ‘I promise…’) is non-observational because it’s analytic according to 
my analysis. Now my stipulative account says, far from being a special characteristic of agential 
knowledge of self-stipulating speech acts, this is a universal feature of agential knowledge. Every 
intentional action is, simultaneously, an act of self-stipulation that stipulates itself to be the kind 
of action it is in the same way sincerely uttering ‘I apologize…’ stipulates the utterance itself to 
be an act of apology. For example, when I make an omelette, as an intentional action, the 
omelette-making action stipulates itself to count as an act of omelette-making no matter how 
clumsy and poor my execution of the action is. That is, the action itself establishes the semantic 
fact that it’s part of the reference/extension of the notion ‘making omelette’. Thus, if I hold the 
belief that I’m making an omelette (as I must be when the action is intentional), that belief is 
justified in virtue of the stipulative meaning of ‘making omelette’.13 The belief is warranted a 
priori. This metaphysics of intentional action explains NOT. 
 
13 This implies, if I weren’t making an omelette despite my intention and belief to be doing so, my belief 
wouldn’t be analytically justified as it would have been if I were indeed making an omelette. No 
intentional action, no analytic justification — regardless of what the agent believes. How can intentional 
actions fail to happen despite one’s belief and intent? To answer this fully, we need an analysis of all the 
essential components of an intentional action. A comprehensive analysis of intentional action is beyond 
the scope of this essay. For a partial answer, see section 5.1. Here, I want to focus on presenting the basics 
of the account before diving into complications. 
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 The stipulative account delivers all three features we want in an account of agential 
knowledge. First, the view gives us [1]. The warrant for our agential knowledge stems from our 
performance of those actions. Unlike Haddock, who simply argues why that must be the case, the 
stipulative account explains how the actions themselves can do that. It’s straightforwardly the 
actions themselves that create the analytic justification for our agential knowledge. There is no 
middleman between the action and our agential knowledge doing the justificatory work. 
 Second, the account also gives us [3]. It makes our agential knowledge independent of self-
knowledge about intentions. Surely, if φ-ing intentionally entails having the intention to φ,14 the 
warrant of our agential knowledge of φ-ing is impossible without our intention to φ. And surely, 
if Shoemaker’s right that self-blindness is impossible for mental states under our rational control, 
it’s necessary that, whenever one has an intention, one has access to that intention. As a result, 
there is a trivial sense that it’s impossible for a rational agent to have agential knowledge of her 
φ-ing without also knowing that she intends to φ. Still, her agential knowledge doesn’t, in a more 
robust sense, stem from her knowledge of her intent to φ. 
 Finally, the account also has [2]. It provides us with theoretical resources for explicitly 
unifying agential knowledge and the Kripkean contingent a priori as a kind of maker’s 
knowledge. It’s already hinted at earlier. But to fully appreciate the kind of unification the 
stipulative account offers, it’s useful to discuss a tempting yet ultimately unsatisfactory way to 
unify agential knowledge and the contingent a prior by considering a well-known objection to 
the Kripkean examples. 
 It seems that a stipulator doesn’t need empirical inquiry to figure out that s is one meter. At 
the same time, it seems that her knowledge is about a contingent fact. Putting the two together, it 
 
14 Bratman (1984) argues against this. But I find Ludwig’s (1992: 270) response compelling. 
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does seem that Kripke has given us an example where a single piece of knowledge is both 
contingent and a priori. But, so the objection goes, the person actually has two pieces of 
knowledge. She knows that (a) whatever object she uses as the standard meter, that object is one 
meter and that (b) she uses s as the standard meter. While (a) is knowable a priori, it’s necessary. 
By contrast, while (b) is contingent, it’s only knowable a posteriori. So, the stipulator of the 
standard meter has two pieces of knowledge. One of them is necessary and a priori, the other 
contingent and a posteriori. It’s by conflating these two that creates the illusion that the 
stipulator has one piece of knowledge that’s both contingent and a priori.15 Since this objection 
relies on some form of two-dimensionalist analysis of content, I’ll call it the 2D objection.16 
 The 2D objection assumes that (b) is only knowable a posteriori. But the stipulator’s 
knowledge of (b) is agential knowledge. Is that a problem? Not everyone who accepts NOT has a 
problem with that. For example, if you are like Peacocke who thinks that we’re consciously 
 
15 See BonJour 1998, Turri 2011. 
16 A clarification about the dialectic. Although (a) and (b) jointly entail that s is one meter, that alone 
doesn’t imply that the stipulator’s belief that s is one meter just is the fact of her holding two distinct 
beliefs (a) and (b), let alone implying that the belief’s appearance of being contingent a priori stems from 
our conflating (a) and (b). The 2D objection serves as a way out for those who already have an initial 
inclination to accept the traditional view that necessity and apriority go together. Its goal isn’t to prove 
that the Kripkean examples are indeed confusions but to show that those examples aren’t strong evidence 
to convince someone who is initially skeptical of contingent a priori. These examples still work for those 
who are initially neutral. By setting out to explain away the appearance of contingent a priori, the 
objection basically acknowledges that those Kripkean cases have the prima facie appearance of being 
contingent a priori. 
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aware of our intentional actions and that such action awareness — though somehow not a kind of 
observation17 — is no more a source of a priori knowledge than our awareness of our headache, 
then you may be content with the claim that the stipulator’s knowledge of (b) is a posteriori yet 
not observational in a restricted sense. 
 If we pull (a) and (b) apart as the 2D objection suggests, one might be tempted to think that, 
if we accept that the stipulator’s knowledge that s is one meter just is her knowledge of (a) and 
(b), and if the stipulator’s knowledge of (b) is agential knowledge, then the stipulator’s 
knowledge is based on agential knowledge no matter what theory of agential knowledge one 
endorses. It’s tempting to think that we already have a way to put agential knowledge and 
Kripkean contingent a priori in a unified picture. We don’t need a specific theory of agential 
knowledge for that. It isn’t something the stipulative account is in a better position to offer. 
 What [2] asks for is a framework to unify agential knowledge and some form of maker’s 
knowledge as the same kind of knowledge. The basis for [2] is that, intuitively, an intentional 
action is what we produce and that, like other forms of maker’s knowledge, we know about our 
actions by producing them. 
 
17 I say ‘somehow’ because I confess I don’t understand how Peacocke’s action awareness isn’t a form of 
observation. He argued that Shoemaker’s Independent Condition (IC) of observation doesn’t apply to 
action awareness. One would have thought that Peacocke takes IC to be a defining feature for 
observation. But his argument ends up implying that IC doesn’t even apply to observation: ‘The blind 
person can conceive of objective states of affairs involving objects, events, their properties, and spatial 
relations only because she is capable of perceiving these things and properties in at least some other sense 
modality.’ (2009: 205). So, I’m not sure what to make of the argument. 
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 For the sake of illustration, let’s assume Setiya’s view that the stipulator’s agential 
knowledge of (b) is based on her knowing how to pick a stick as a measurement standard. Then, 
based on (a), she’s justified to believe that the stick she picks is one meter in virtue of what she 
knowingly stipulates ‘meter’ to mean. Notice that, regardless of how she comes to learn about 
what ‘meter’ means, her belief that s is one meter is true in virtue of the meaning of ‘meter’. So, 
whereas her agential knowledge is warranted based on her know-how, her knowledge that s is 
one meter isn’t; whereas her knowledge that s is one meter is warranted analytically, her agential 
knowledge isn’t. In this picture, agential knowledge and the Kripkean contingent a priori are 
intimately related; yet, they are different kinds of knowledge. 
 The stipulative account can do better. According to it, not only can we say that the 
stipulator’s knowledge that s is one meter is inferentially related to her agential knowledge of 
(b). We can also say that they are both stipulative knowledge: something we know analytically in 
virtue of the semantic facts we create.18 Anscombe argued that intentional actions are epistemic 




There is much more to be said to develop my account than what I can adequately discuss in one 




18 If my account is true, the 2D objection fails because (a) and (b) are both a priori. 
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Does my theory make intentional action too easy? Analytic justification is conclusive. By 
making stipulation sufficient for the analytic justification of our beliefs about our intentional 
actions, my theory implies that we can truly be doing something by stipulation. That seems to 
make actions too easy; after all, I can’t jump to the moon simply by declaring so. 
 My response has two parts: (a) properly understood, performing an action isn’t as difficult as 
the objection suggests; (b) properly understood, stipulation isn’t as easy as the objection 
suggests. 
 (a) Performance isn’t that difficult. Performing an action does not mean the action is 
successfully executed. I might be walking to the store, but the action I’m performing may fail to 
be successfully executed because I’m knocked down by a car before I get there (e.g., see 
Thompson 2011, Falvey 2000). I might also perform the action of shooting a three-pointer but 
execute that poorly. Once we acknowledge that poorly executed actions are intentional actions 
nonetheless, we’ll realize that failure to perform an intentional action isn’t as widespread as one 
might have thought. Agential knowledge is about an agent’s knowing the intentional actions she 
performs, well executed or not. 
 (b) Stipulation isn’t that easy. The objection stems partly from the fact that stipulation seems 
trivial. It’s tempting to think so if we conflate stipulating with assuming or guessing or 
pretending. Consider this: a family can stipulate Friday nights to be family nights when everyone 
should be home for dinner. Their stipulation makes Friday nights their family nights. By contrast, 
I cannot stipulate Friday nights to be their family nights. At best, I can assume or guess or 
pretend that Friday nights are their family nights. I’m not in the position to literally make that 
stipulation even if I wholeheartedly believe otherwise. My point being, there are nontrivial 
restrictions on stipulation that aren’t up to us. 
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 We shouldn’t think that stipulating what one’s doing is trivial as long as we recall how the 
relevant stipulations work in my account. When I φ intentionally, the intentional action φ itself is 
the act of stipulation. The stipulation that produces the relevant analytic justification isn’t a 
separate mental act that accompanies φ. Since the act of stipulation is identical to the intentional 
action itself, any necessary condition for intentional actions is automatically a necessary 
condition for the stipulation that produces analytic justification for our agential knowledge. This 
brings in nontrivial constraints on an agent’s self-stipulation that isn’t up to us. 
 Although agential knowledge is an essential component of intentional action, the goal of this 
essay is to analyze agential knowledge, not intentional action per se. So, as disappointing as it 
might be, I won’t commit myself to any necessary components of intentional actions beyond the 
requirement of agential knowledge. But just to illustrate how the metaphysics of intentional 
action can impose nontrivial constraint on our ability to stipulate in a way that isn’t up to us, let’s 
assume the following necessary condition for intentional action: to perform an intentional action, 
it’s necessary that its successful execution is objectively probable. The chance of winning the 
lottery is objectively slim. Although one can buy a lottery ticket intentionally and even happen to 
win, one cannot intentionally win the lottery. Since one cannot perform the intentional action of 
winning the lottery, the self-stipulation my account appeals to — i.e., the intentional action itself 
— isn’t available. Thus, even if one wholeheartedly believes that one is intentionally winning the 
lottery by buying a ticket on a particular day and happens to win, that belief wouldn’t be justified 
by self-stipulation. 
 Putting the two together, making stipulation sufficient for intentional action doesn’t make 
intentional action too easy because, properly understood, intentional actions aren’t hard and 
stipulation isn’t easy. 
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 This response highlights a unique aspect of my view. Discussion about agential knowledge 
often carries a reductionist undertone. We’re meant to build up our understanding of intentional 
actions by first investigating their components, e.g., agential knowledge. The stipulative account 
requires a holistic reimagination of the division of labor. As much as studying the nature of 
agential knowledge helps us understand intentional actions, having a grasp of the nature 
intentional actions also informs our epistemology of agential knowledge in an indispensable 
way. Neither of them comes first.19 To ease ourselves into this hermeneutical circle, I have been 
focusing on agential knowledge and remained largely non-committal regarding intentional 
actions but, actually, a full understanding of agential knowledge cannot be achieved with a blank 
slate about intentional actions. 
 
5.2 Stipulate Knowingly 
I omitted one detail when I presented the stipulative theory. My prison guard example shows that 
the idea of physical stipulation allows someone to stipulate unknowingly. However, for a 
stipulation to generate a priori justification, it must be done knowingly. 
 Say one φ-s intentionally. According to my view, this intentional action makes two 
descriptions true simultaneously: (1) one is φ-ing; and (2) one is stipulating this to count as φ-
ing. One might object that people who φ intentionally don’t normally know (2). Why? One might 
say, if those agents were asked whether they’re stipulating anything, they’re unlikely to respond 
positively. Whereas this is a prima facie reason for thinking that agents who φ don’t necessarily 
know (2), it’s inconclusive.  
 
19 Thus, I’m not advocating an intentional action-first approach (see Levy 2013). 
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 I want to say those agents do know that (2). Imagine you’re making pancakes. Being an 
incompetent cook, you buzz around making a mess, not unlike the mess you made baking a cake 
before. What makes this mess count as pancake-making and that mess cake-baking? You do. I 
reckon you would acknowledge that. In this sense, agents who φ intentionally know they make 
something count as φ-ing. One simply needs to probe in the right way to elicit responses that 
reveal this. 
 Stipulative justification requires the stipulation to be done knowingly, but it doesn’t require 
the stipulation to be an intentional action itself. Thus, technically, the agent’s first-person 
knowledge of (1) and (2) don’t need to be justified the same way, both as agential knowledge. 
Nonetheless, it’s plausible and parsimonious to say so. A problem arises though. 
 If an agent’s knowledge of (2) is agential knowledge of that very intentional act of 
stipulation, my account implies that this intentional stipulation is, in turn, also an act of self-
stipulation that stipulates itself to count as an act of stipulation. The agent knows a priori that she 
stipulates what she does to count as φ-ing because, with the same act, she stipulates that to be an 
act of stipulation. An infinite regress of stipulative knowledge emerges whenever one acts 
intentionally. 
 One might present this as a reductio against my theory because our finite minds cannot hold 
infinitely many beliefs. But that’s false. Our mind can’t hold infinitely many occurrent beliefs, 
but we have infinitely many standing beliefs. For all number n > 2, I know I’m shorter than n 
meters. There are infinitely many n; therefore, I have infinitely many beliefs. My view accepts 
that it’s constitutive of every intentional action that the agent has infinitely many levels of 
stipulative knowledge: that she’s φ-ing, that she makes this count as φ-ing, that she makes this 
count as making this count as φ-ing, etc. And the regress isn’t vicious: each layer of agential 
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knowledge is explained by stipulation at the next level without circularity and without running 
out of explanation.20 
 
5.3 The Third-Person 
We began with the intuition that an agent’s knowledge about her actions is different in kind from 
a spectator’s knowledge about others’ actions. Intuitively, part of this difference consists in the 
fact that agential knowledge is based on a special, non-observational warrant and a spectator’s 
knowledge isn’t. 
 Let’s say Newton defined a technical notion of force by his laws of motion. So, it’s true in 
virtue of meaning that F = ma. And it’s an analytic truth not only for Newton, who stipulated the 
technical meaning of force, but for everyone who is part of the discourse. 
 According to my view, when I’m making an omelette, my intentional action stipulates itself 
to count as an instance of omelette-making. As a result, my belief that I’m making an omelette is 
analytically justified because it’s true on the basis of what I help stipulate ‘omelette-making’ to 
mean. Suppose you, also being in the kitchen, believe that I’m making an omelette too. If my 
belief is analytically justified, so is yours. The stipulative account implies that agential 
knowledge and spectator knowledge are both typically non-observationally justified. Isn’t that a 
problem? 
 
20 Is invoking infinitely many layers of agential knowledge non-parsimonious? Not obviously. A theory is 
non-parsimonious only if everything it’s meant to do can be achieved by with less commitments. So far, 
only my view can accommodate the three desirable features in section 2. Perhaps there are other criteria 
that we want our theory to capture and doing so requires us to compromise some of the three features. But 
that would be about weighing different explanatory goals, not about parsimony. 
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 I’m not sure that this isn’t a cost of the view. But I’m not sure that it is a cost either. That 
agential and some spectator knowledge both turn out to be a priori doesn’t mean they are a 
priori in the same way. In fact, my account says that they aren’t: an agent’s analytic justification 
is based on the semantic facts she creates by performing intentional actions; a spectator’s 
analytic justification is based on the semantic facts that she acknowledges others create. The 
view doesn’t eliminate the first-person vs. third-person asymmetry. 
 If not being in total agreement with our intuition alone is a cost, and if it’s intuitively the 
case that the agential vs. spectator knowledge asymmetry partly consists in the fact that the latter 
is observational but the former isn’t, then it’s prima facie a cost of my view that both agential 
and spectator knowledge are justified a priori. But it’s a cost my view can say something about 
to neutralize. (So, perhaps, it’s no longer a cost.) 
 Intuitively, these two claims are true: (1) agential knowledge is non-observational; and (2) 
agential and spectator knowledge have different kinds of warrant. One might say that it’s a 
tempting mistake to make the further claim that spectator knowledge is observational; it’s a 
result of an invalid inference based on (1) and (2). And there is an independent motivation for 
saying so if one is sympathetic to Moran’s (2004: 57) reason for thinking that agential 
knowledge is non-observational. He says that, if you’re walking down the Fifth Avenue but 
forget what you’re doing, no amount of observation can restore your agential knowledge about 
what you are doing. You just have to decide what to do again. If none of my observations can 
restore knowledge of what I’m doing, I don’t see how an onlooker’s observation can do better. 
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 All I want to do is to show how my view has the resources to defuse this objection. 
Developing an account of third-person knowledge about intentional actions to complement the 
stipulative account is a task for another occasion.21 
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